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trial court refuse to submit the issue of wantonness to the jury unless
the facts alleged justify such a finding.
The decision in the principle case seems clearly sound, and it is hoped
that it will have a salutary effect in the future.
GEORGE BALEY.
PRACTICE
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION AND AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
One of the most important of the recent decisions rendered by the
Supreme Court of Ohio was the decision of the case of Dowd-Feder,
Inc. v. Truesdell, 130 Ohio St. 530, 5 Ohio Op. 179 (Decided March
i8, i936).
The action was brought to recover damages for injuries sustained
by the plaintiff, when he was struck by an automobile driven in a negli-
gent manner by an employee of the defendant. The defense was being
conducted by an attorney known by counsel for the plaintiff to be an
"insurance company's lawyer." At the trial counsel for the plaintiff on
the voir dire examination of prospective jurors was permitted to question
them as to their relationship to or interest in a casualty insurance com-
pany. The defense moved for withdrawal of a juror because of those
questions, and such motion having been denied, exceptions were duly
taken. A verdict was returned for the plaintiff and judgment was
rendered thereon. The defendant prosecuted error to the Court of
Appeals where the judgment was affirmed. The case was presented to
the Supreme Court on the allowance of a motion to certify.
The Supreme Court held: "In the examination of a prospective
juror upon his voir dire in cases involving property damage, personal
injury, or both, he may be asked the general question whether he has
or has had any connection with or interest in a casualty insurance
company. * * * "
"All questions in the voir dire examination must be propounded in
good faith. The character and scope of such questions cannot become
standardized, but must be controlled by the court in the exercise of its
sound discretion, the court having for its purpose the securing to every
litigant an unbiased jury."
The decision of the Supreme Court in the principal case apparently
settles that much debated question as to the extent to which counsel may
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be permitted to interrogate jurors in regard to their relations to or
interest in a casualty insurance company.
The court modifies the rule previously promulgated in the case of
Vega, Admr. v. Evans, 128 Ohio St. 535, 191 N.E. 757, 40 O.L.R.
65o, 95 A.L.R. 381 (1934). In the latter case the court held that it
was error to permit counsel on the voir dire examination of prospective
jurors to question them as to their connection with or interest in a
liability insurance company, unless such an insurance company is a
party to the action or unless such company or the defense had previously
disclosed to the court that the insurance company is actively and directly
interested in the result of the action.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Pavilonis v. Valentine, 120
Ohio St. i54, i65 N.E. 730, 28 O.L.R. 639 (1929), overruled by
its holding in the case of Vega, Ildmr. v. Evans, supra, was virtually
reaffirmed by the rule laid down in the Dowd-Feder case, supra. In
the Pazilonis case the court held: "It is not error to permit the exam-
ination of a prospective juror on his voir dire as to his connection with,
interest in or relationship to a casualty insurance company where such
a company is directly or indirectly interested in the result of the trial."
A potent objection to the principle established by the decision of the
Supreme Court in the Dowd-Feder case, was voiced by Chief Justice
Marshall in his opinion dissenting from the decision in the case of
Pavilonis v. Valentine, when he stated: "* * * Experience has shown
that parties insured for $5,ooo frequently are subjected to verdicts for
$io,ooo, $I5,ooo, or more. * * * After this decision is published
the owner of an automobile will be between the upper and nether miU-
stone. If he omits to carry insurance, he will carry a very great risk.
If he carries a $5,ooo policy, which is the amount usually carried, he
runs a greater risk of an adverse verdict, and that verdict may be enor-
mously larger than the amount of the policy." (Italics mine).
The Wisconsin legislature in 1931 authorized the joining of cas-
ualty insurance companies as parties defendant in cases where they are
interested in the outcome of the litigation. Wis. Stat. (1931) Sec.
26o.i i. In any case where such an insurance company has been joined
as a party defendant, proper disclosure of the extent of its liability could
be made at the trial. It is submitted that the enactment of such legisla-
tion in Ohio would afford a sufficient remedy to alleviate the evil which
might arise in cases where the amount of the defendant's liability insur-
ance has not been disclosed, and where as a result of such non-disclosure
the defendant is exposed to the risk of an excessively large verdict.
Objection might be raised to the enactment of similar legislation,
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on the ground that the rates .of casualty insurance would be increased
to a very great extent as a result of the disclosure to the jury that an
insurance company is interested in the case. The extent of the increase
in rates which the proposed legislation might engender, may be sug-
gested by a comparison of certain rates in Wisconsin with those in
Minnesota where joinder is not permitted. Territorially, the comparison
may be fairly based on that unit area known as "remainder of state"
area, which includes the rural districts and thus affords the largest and
most substantially similar (as to driving conditions) basis of comparison.
The Manual of the National Bureau of Casualty and Security Under-
writers reveals that the personal injury liability insurance rates in Wis-
consin are approximately fifty per cent higher than the rates in Minne-
sota. A similar comparison of rates in Wisconsin with those in Ohio
discloses that the rates in the former state are forty-one per cent greater
than the Ohio rates for the same coverage. This material difference in
rates, it is reasonable to suppose, is due in no small degree to the greater
risk arising from the authorized disclosure that an insurance company is
a party defendant. Thus a similar increase in casualty insurance rates in
Ohio may be reasonably expected to result from the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Dowd-Feder, Inc. v. Truesdell, supra.
Some lawyers have suggested the possibility of avoiding the risk of
enormous verdicts against insured defendants in cases where insurance
companies have been "insinuated" into the case. This would take the
form of a voluntary disclosure revealing all the facts relative to insur-
ance.
The lack of financial responsibility on the part of a great number of
motorists has become a focal point for agitation in numerous states for
remedial legislation. The most far reaching of the statutory enactments
to date is the Massachusetts Compulsory Insurance Law. Ann. Laws
of Mass., Chap. 90, Sec. 3 4 A, etc. (1925). This legislation requires
as a condition precedent to the registration by an owner of his motor
vehicle, that he prove his financial responsibility with respect to liability
for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident. Although the
statute stipulates three alternative methods by which this proof may be
made, such proof has in almost every case taken the form of a liability
insurance policy.
Ohio is numbered among those states which have enacted so-called
"Financial Responsibility Laws." Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 6928-1, etc.
The laws, although serving a worthy purpose, are by no means adequate,
for they provide that type of protection which is metaphorically termed,
"locking the stable door after the horse has been stolen." These laws
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usually provide that after a judgment has been rendered against a
motorist for damages arising out of an automobile accident, if such
judgment remains unsatisfied, he must provide proof of his financial
responsibility by securing insurance protection, depositing security with
the state, or providing a satisfactory bond; otherwise his motor vehicle
license is subject to revocation.
Under a "compulsory insurance law" such as that in effect in
Massachusetts, the jury could reasonably assume that an insurance com-
pany was interested in the action and therefore no prbjudice would arise
by reason of the questioning of prospective jurors upon their voir dire
as to their connection with or interest in a liability insurance company.
A group of eminent lawyers, the "Committee to Study Compensa-
tion for Automobile Accident," has suggested a plan of compensation for
injuries resulting from motor car accidents comparable to that of the
workmen's compensation laws. An outline by Arthur B. Ballentine,
chairman of the committee, appears in 18 Am. Bar Assoc. Jour. 221
(932). A symposium in 32 COL. L. REV. 785 (1932) presents the
arguments for and against this plan.
If such a step is not feasible it might be possible to combine in Ohio
the essential features of the Wisconsin statute permitting the joinder of
insurance companies as parties defendant, with those of the Massa-
chusetts "compulsory insurance law." This would obviate possible ob-
jections to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dowd-Feder
v. Truesdell, supra. More important, it would assure the financial
responsi'bility of those who own and operate motor vehicles.
JAMES R. TRITSCHLER.
TRUSTS
NATURE OF THE RIGHT OF A CESTUI QUE TRUST WITH PAR-
TICULAR REFERENCE TO TAXATION
Plaintiff, an Ohio resident, held seven transferable trust certificates,
representing undivided equitable interests in land, some parcels of which
were situated within and some without Ohio. The beneficiary was
entitled to a share of the rentals, while exclusive powers of management
were vested in the several trustees. The Ohio Intangible Tax Law,
Sections 5323, 5328-I, 5370, 5389, 5638, General Code, provided
for a tax, measured by five per cent of the income yield, on the invest-
ments of Ohio residents. The definition of investments included "equit-
